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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this project is to analyse the possible causes and the effects of 
the economic crisis in East-asian region with particular emphasis of the impact 
on Malaysia in respect of the RINGGIT and the KUALA LUMPUR STOCK 
EXCHANGE; how the crisis affects countries in other regions. The issues of 
whether the I MF can solve the prevailing problems in this region and how 
Mexican's crisis is different from the East-asian are also discussed. Lastly, 
several recommendations are made with a view to strengthen and improve the 
economic fundamentals of Malaysia. 
The possible causes of the crisis incudes: poor financial and banking system 
resulting in substantial non-performing loans, Investors' loss of confidence, less 
competitive exports, unproductive investments and over-dependence on the 
foreign capital. 
Malaysia was hit badly by this crisis. The value of Ringgit fell from 2. 6450 in July 
1997 to 4. 1550 against the US Dollar in July 1998 whilst the Composite Index fell 
from 1,0 12. 84 in July 1997 to 402.65 in July 1998 . The Gross Domestic Product 
( GDP ) growth rate was forecasted to be - 1% to -2% compared with the average 
GDP growth rate of 8.8 % for the period between 1988 to 1997. 
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It is evident that IMF cannot provide solution to East-asian countries as countries 
who resorted to I MF's bail-out do not seem to recover from their crisis. 
East-asian's crisis is by nature different from that of the Mexican's crisis in 1995. 
The former is solvency crisis whereas the latter is liquidity crisis. 
Malaysian government should strengthen its economic fundamentals by 
implementing several measures such as making it compulsory to make use of 
local manufactured parts. Agriculture sector should be revived as it can save 
the country for RM 9 billion on food. To develop Information Technology, 
Education and Tourism sectors to generate foreign exchange for the country. 
Regulations should be imposed to prevent sudden outflow of foreign portfolio­
funds. The Banking sectors has to be strengthen and not to allow politicians to 
have hands in the Banking industry loans should only be approved based on its 
merit only. 
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Chapter I .' Introduction To East-asian Financial Crisis 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO 
EAST -ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the past 7-8 years, countries in the East-asia which recovered from the 
1 987 recession, were consistently achieving considerably high growth rates. 
Many had regarded this achievement as an ' Economic Miracle '. These countries 
had moderate inflation, an absence of significant fiscal imbalances and high 
savings rates. Since the beginning of 1 997, some of these have started to 
experience an economic slowdown again which eventually has turned into 
currency and economic crisis. As a result of the crisis, stock market crashed, both 
currency and prices of property depreciated. 
Countries affected by this crisis at varying degree include China, Hong Kong, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. 
Some of these countries such as China, Hong Kong and Singapore are in the 
course of recovery whilst others including Malaysia are stil l  struggling to 
overcome this crisis. Three countries - Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea 
turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance. The total bailout 
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package for these countries amounted to US $ 1 1 8.6 billion, the largest ever 
bailout arranged under IMF. 
The fall in the exchange rate and the value of stocks affect businesses badly, it 
undermine the financial system, and the foreign debt obligations were accordingly 
multiplied. As a result, businesses in East-asian countries are badly affected. The 
crisis has demonstrated how closely the currency and stock markets in the region 
are inter-linked and how the political and economic circumstances of neighbouring 
countries affect one another. 
Unfortunately, some of the leaders in Asian countries do not acknowledge their 
own weaknesses in respect of their policies and systems but merely attributed the 
currency crisis solely to foreign currency speculators who are said to have 
reprimanded the weaker Southeast-asian countries for the reason that they went 
against the American's wish to admit Myanmar into the Association of South-east 
Asia Nation ( ASEAN ). 
This reflects an alarming level of economic illiteracy on the part of the leaders in 
this region. It also indicates their dangerous unwillingness to accept how an 
open capitalist economy works. 
1.2 Objective of Study 
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Chapter 1 " Introduction To East-asian Financial Crisis 
The objective of this study is to analyse the impact of the crisis to the East­
asian countries the possible causes and some related issues including that of 
whether IMF can provide any solution to the crisis and whether the crisis in this 
region affect countries in other regions. A more in-depth study was made in respect 
of Malaysia's currency, its stock market and what are the sectors affected most 
by the crisis. Several recommendations are made with a view to solve the 
country's economic predicament. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS 
During the Crisis, these East-asian countries have suffered a loss in currency 
depreciation which ranges averagely from 35 % to 50 %. Their stock market 
value has declined drastically by at least 60% in dollar terms since January 1 997. 
The currency crisis started in June 1997 with the sharp decline of Thai Baht of 
47% against US-dollars over period of the subsequent 8 months. Then the 
Philippino Peso lost 35% of its value over the same period followed by 
Indonesia's Rupiah which lost 76% ; the Malaysian Ringgit lost 38 % and the 
Singapore Dollar lost 20%. 
The Singapore Dollar had gained an average of 3 % per annum over 2 2  years to 
March, 1 996. T-he cumulative gain of the Singapore dollar over 22 years was 
effectively cut by half in 8 months! Likewise, The Ringgit was holding steadily 
against the US-Dol/ar over the last 12 years until 1994, this steady rate was lost 
within just a few weeks. 
The currency crisis and stock-market turmoil have resulted in many companies 
including financial institutions in East-asian countries technically bankcrupt. 
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However, hardly any have been liquidated due to legal complications relating to 
the bankcruptcy law and government support. Some governments prefer to 
rescue the politically well-connected ones from insolvency. Everywhere the 
volume of bad debt is simply too huge. For this reason, foreign investors have 
lost their confidence in these markets. 
As a result of the crisis, many countries in this region have recently revised 
their GOP growth forecast in 1 998 with negative growth rate as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 . - Revised growth forecasts of East -asian countries 
EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES 
Lower 1998 Growth Forecasts 
Previous Current ( Revised ) 
MALAYSIA 2.0 % to 3.0 % -1.0 % to -2.0 % 
Hong Kong 5.3% 3.0% 
China 8.8% 8.0% 
Japan 1 . 1 %  -1 .5% 
Taiwan 6.9% 5.5% to 6.0% 
Korea 5.5% -4.0% 
Singapore 4.8% 0.5% to 1 .5% 
Philippines 3.8% 2.5% 
Thailand 0.4% -4.0% to -5.5% 
Indonesia 2.0% -1 3% 
. . . . Source : Mlnlstenal Statement, Dewan Rakyat July 13, 1998 . 
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CHAPTER 3 
IMPACT OF CRISIS ON MALAYSIA 
3.1 Introduction 
Prior to the crisis in 1 997, there were many favourable features in the Malaysian 
economy. During the period between 1 988 to 1 996, Malaysia's Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth was in average 8.8 % per annum as shown in table 2 , 
inflation rate was low of around 3.8 %, and the unemployment rate for 1 996 was 
only 2.5 %. Unlike other East-asian countries, Malaysia has a relatively low 
amount of external debts of US 45.2 billion dollar or 42 % of the GDP as at June 
1 997. The debt ratio was only 6.1 % of the exports as at end-1 996. The banking 
sector was healthy, with non-performing loan ( NPL ) accounted for only 3.6 % 
of the total loans as at June 1 997. Malaysia's saving rate at 38.5 % in 1 996 
was one of the highest in the world. 
3.2 Impact of The Crisis 
In consequence of the regional crisis, the Ringgit depreciated against US dollars 
since July 1 997. The month-end closing price against the US Dollar is shown in 
Table 3. 
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Table 2: Malaysia's Real gross domestic product growth (1988 - 1998) 
YEAR REAL GOP GOP GROWTH 
(RM BILLION ) (% ) 
1 988 66.3 8.9 
1 989 72.4 9.2 
1 990 79.5 9.7 
1 991  86.3 8.7 
1 992 93.1 7.8 
1 993 1 00 .. 6 8.3 
1 994 1 09.9 9.2 
1 995 1 20.3 9.5 
1 996 1 30.6 8.6 
1 997 141 .1 8.0 
1 998 * Not Available Yet - 1 .0 to -2.0 
Base Year: 1987 ( Market Prices) 
Source : Past Bank Negara Reports 
& Investors Digest, September 1997 
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The exchange rate against the US Dollar has been very steady between 2.49 ( or 
US $ 0.401 1 for every Ringgit) and 2.5760 ( or US$ 0.3882 for every Ringgit) . 
Starting in July 1 997, the exchange rate declined drastically with July month 
closed at 2.6450 ( or US $ 0.3781 for every Ringgit ). August 1 997 closed at 
2.9750 and surpassing 3.0000 Ringgit mark thereafter. The month end closing in 
January 1 998, June 1 998 and July 1 998 even surpassed the 4.0000 Ringgit 
mark. 
In an effort to prevent currency speculation, the Malaysian government has 
undertaken the following measures : -
• In early August 1 997, Bank Negara Malaysia imposed a US $ 2 million limit on 
outstanding non-commercial -related ringgit offer-side swap transaction with 
any single foreign customer. 
• Subsequently, KLSE declared the 1 00 component stocks of the Composite 
Index as de�ignated securities. 
• Short -selling in the stock market was suspended. 
• Local funds such as the Employees Provident Fund ( EPF ) and Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad ( PNB ) were invited to support the market at the time when 
the foreign funds were retreating. 
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Table 3: Ringgit vs Against US $ and Effect On The Composite Index 
EXCHANGE RATES 
MONTHS US DOLLAR RINGGIT COMPOSITE 
1 US $ RM 1 INDEX 
Jan-96 2.5760 0.3882 1 ,055.42 
Feb-96 2.5600 0.3906 1 ,084.41 
Mar-96 2.5480 0.3925 1 ,1 49.08 
Apr-96 2.5030 0.3995 1 ,1 89.54 
May-96 2.51 00 0.3984 1 ,14 1 .07 
Jun-96 2.5050 0.3992 1 ,1 36.31 
JUI-96 2.5050 0.3992 1 ,068.23 
Aug-96 2.5050 0.3992 1 ,1 1 8.57 
Sep-96 2.5 180 0.3971 1 ,1 35.27 
Oct-96 2.5430 0.3932 1 ,1 68.31 
Nov-96 2.5370 0.3942 1 ,226.52 
Dec-96 2.5390 0.3939 1 ,237.96 
Jan-97 2.4960 0.4006 1 ,21 6.72 
Feb-97 2.4930 0.401 1 1 ,270.67 
Mar-97 2.491 5 0.401 4  1 ,21 7.64 
Apr-97 2.5230 0.3964 1 ,080.1 7  
May-97 2.5230 0.3964 1 ,1 04.83 
Jun-97 2.5345 0.3946 1 ,077.30 
Jul-97 2.6450 0.3781 1,012.84 
Aug-97 2.9750 0.3361 804.40 
Sep-97 3.1 250 0.3200 814.57 
Oct-97 3.4580 0.2892 664.69 
Nov-97 3.5330 0.2830 545.44 
Dec-97 3.9250 0.2548 594.44 
Jan-98 4.1 300 0.2421 701 .80 
Feb-98 3.71 80 0.2690 745. 1 2  
Mar-98 3.7080 0.2697 71 9.52 
Apr-98 3.7750 0.2649 625.97 
May-98 3.9380 0.2539 538.24 
Jun-98 4.2080 0.2376 455.64 
Jul-98 4.1550 0.2407 402.65 
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As a result of the economic slowdown, the Malaysian government, like what other 
neighbouring countries did, revised downward the forecast of economic 
performance in 1 998 which is shown in Table 4 to reflect the more realistic 
figures : -
Table 4: Malaysia's Revised Performance Forecast For 1998 
• Growth of real Growth Domestic Product for 1998 revised to -1% to - 2%. 
• Inflation rate for 1998 is expected at 7 % to 8 %. 
• Current account in the balance payments expected to register a surplus 
of RM 2 billion or 1 % of the Gross National Product ( GNP ). 
• Federal Government Budget deficit for 1998 to increase to RM 10 billion 
or 3.7 % of GNP. 
The Crisis will indeed slow-down Malaysia's economy over a period of the next 3 
- 5 years before it can be fully recover back to the present economy scenario, 
provided that the Malaysian government can implement effective policies with full 
commitment. 
Malaysia is very much less dependent on foreign debt, and so has managed to 
avoid resorting to the IMF's bail-out programs. Nevertheless, the ' curbs on bank 
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lending ' regulation imposed in December 1 997 by the BNM have left companies 
desperate for money. This would threaten to bring about the collapse of the 
property market and an ensuing cycle of banking distress. Having for years failed 
to persuade banks to merge voluntarily, the BNM finally resorted to get the banks 
to merge by m�ndatory requirement. 
As a result of the depreciated Ringgit, for Malaysian, transactions in US currency 
has become very expensive indeed. On the other hand, to the American, 
transactions in Ringgit nave become very cheap. In fact, Malaysia's Ringgit has 
been effectively devalued by some 40 % over a period of 7 months since July 
1 997. This means the per capita GDP of Malaysian has reduced from somewhere 
in the region of US$5,OOO to just about US$ 3,000 which is a dramatic loss of 
value. For Malaysian companies which have borrowed foreign loans are now 
having to service higher interest as well as paying back higher amount of capital 
sum. They will also incur higher costs of foreign imports. For example, 
Malaysians import US 1 billion worth of foreign food, have to pay RM 4 billion 
now instead of RM 2.5 billion what they used to pay. 
Further, despite the effort of encouraging trade amongst ASEAN countries, the 
intra-ASEAN trades are still undertaken in US dollars, which means that : for 
example the lower cost of buying products from Indonesia or Thailand has not 
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benefited Malaysian citizens because the transactions are billed in US Dollars 
thus Traders are the ONLY ones who have benefited. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EFFECTS OF THE DEPRECIATED RINGGIT 
4.1 Introduction 
Currency movements have varying implications on competitiveness and external 
trade, debt and investment. Because of Ringgit depreciation, Malaysia's 
competitiveness has been enhanced after taking into account the combination of 
the currencies of Malaysia's trading partners and correcting for inflation among 
the countries. The depreciation of the Ringgit against the US Dollar started from 
July 1 997 and is shown in Table 3. As a result, the Malaysian goods are 
relatively cheaper and more competitive than its trading partners. Therefore, we 
expect some increase in exports and with the reduction in imports, should lead to 
a beUer balance of trade. 
4.1 Trade Balance 
The currency.depreciation will generally help to improve the balance in the current 
account. With cheaper Ringgit, exports grow faster than imports, which help to 
reduce the size of the current account deficit. For import, an exchange rate of 
RM4.00 to US$ 1 means that they now have to pay about 37.5 % more compared 
to pre-July 1 997 when the exchange rate was at RM 2.50. 
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On the part of exporters, the depreciation of the Ringgit has given an export boost 
to Malaysian products. When compared with the previous year, the value of 
exports in 1 997 grew by 12.4 % in Ringgit terms, but only 0.5 % in US Dollar 
terms. Compared with the corresponding period in 1 997, export growth for April 
1 998 grew by 44.5 % in Ringgit terms. However, if the exchange rate of RM 3.732 
to US $1 is used, the export growth for April 1 998 fell by 3. 1 %. About 60 - 80 % 
of the inputs for these industries is imported. In 1 997, imports grew by 1 2.0 % in 
Ringgit terms and 0.2% in US Dollar terms. 
4.3 Manufacturing Exports 
The exports from the manufacturing sector are largely from non-resource 
industries and contribute 80 % of the total exports. There are limits to the 
beneficial effect of a devalued currency on manufactured exports. Many firms are 
already operating at full capacity and cannot increase exports quickly to take 
advantage of the depreciating Ringgit. In addition, overseas importers are 
pressing Malaysian exporters for discounts, as such, the value of exports is 
reduced. Furthermore, the cost of imports, which go into manufactured exports, 
has also increased substantially and nullifies the benefits of depreciated currency. 
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